Analog Pin Directionality as an Exfiltration Attack Surface in Mixed-Signal ICs
[Kryptografia i bezpieczeństwo] Autorzy: Ramana Ranganatham, Chirag Adiga, Michael Zuzak i 1 więcej
Mixed-signal SoCs rely on nominally input-only analog pins to acquire off-chip signals, but the directionality of these interfaces is generally treated as a functional property rather than explicitly verified as a security property. This work identifies and experimentally demonstrates a directionality-based class of analog and mixed-signal (AMS) exfiltration attacks in which data-dependent circuit-offset modulation converts a nominally input-only pin into an outbound information channel. We analytically model the attack mechanism and identify three enabling host conditions: a closed-loop amplifier, an exposed amplifier input, and sufficiently high impedance at that pin. This attack class is validated through a representative silicon case study using a photoplethysmography (PPG) analog front-end (AFE) fabricated in a commercial 55-nm CMOS process. The payload incurs $<$0.001\% area overh…
- Kategoria arxiv
- cs.CR
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- Kryptografia i bezpieczeństwo