First Galileo SAS Authenticated Time Solution
[Kryptografia i bezpieczeństwo] Autorzy: Aleix Galan-Figueras, Ignacio Fernandez-Hernandez, Wim De Wilde i 5 więcej
Spoofing attacks against civilian GNSS receivers have grown more common, especially near conflict zones where they now disrupt civil aviation, maritime operations, and critical infrastructure on a daily basis. Spoofing is possible because legacy civil GNSS signals are largely predictable in both their navigation data and ranging codes, allowing an attacker to forge a signal that imposes a false position and time on an unsuspecting receiver. Cryptographic authentication schemes such as Galileo's Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) mitigate this threat by verifying the authenticity of the navigation data. The ranging code itself, however, remains unprotected. To close this gap, Galileo is introducing a Signal Authentication Service (SAS) in the E6-C signal, which directly authenticates ranging measurements. SAS is currently transmitted by only two satellites in an ellip…
- Kategoria arxiv
- cs.CR
- Kategoria
- Kryptografia i bezpieczeństwo